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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers


31 May 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Lynn Davis  
Deputy Assistant Secretary for International  
Security Affairs  
Department of Defense

SUBJECT : Potential Soviet Reactions to PRM-10 AIMS

1. In accordance with your request, attached is the second draft of a paper on "Potential Soviet Reactions to Alternative Integrated Military Strategies (AIMS)" as developed by a working group comprised of analysts from CIA, State/INR, DIA and Service Intelligence components.

2. We have working level approval of this paper by the participating working group members.




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26 May 1977

## Potential Soviet Reactions to Alternative Integrated Military Strategies

### INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS

The following assessment of Soviet reactions to Alternative Integrated Military Strategies (AIMS) is presented in two parts. Part I provides brief accounts of anticipated Soviet reactions to each of the AIMS considered in the PRM-10 force posture review. Part II provides a more general discussion of Soviet reactivity to certain types of US force change, such as decreases or build-up of strategic forces, NATO force posture or world wide intervention capability. These discussions provide some background for the judgments made in the specific reactions presented in Part I.

The judgments presented in this assessment are general in nature. They do not treat likely Soviet declaratory policy, or political and military action. They do not predict specific Soviet force developments, although they do lay a general foundation for force projections when these aspects are studied in more detail.

Specific judgments concerning the reactions of the Soviets, NATO allies and the 3rd world countries may be possible as the AIMS are reduced in number and "fleshed out" -- given a political context, an associated declaratory policy, a time dimension, and a more detailed account of specific U.S. force development and procurement programs, including those we would promote for our allies.

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